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Abstract
It is often necessary to understand each other’s
motivations in order to cooperate. Reaching such
a mutual understanding requires two abilities: to
build models of other’s motivations in order to un-
derstand them, and to build a model of “my” mo-
tivations perceived by others in order to be under-
stood. Having a self-image seen by others requires
two recursive orders of modeling, known in psy-
chology as the first and second orders of theory of
mind. In this paper, we present a second order-
theory of mind cognitive architecture that aims to
facilitate mutual understanding in multi-agent sce-
narios. We study different conditions of empathy
and gratitude leading to irrational cooperation in it-
erated prisoner’s dilemma.
1 Introduction
In any interaction that requires cooperation, agents need to
understand each other’s motivations. A spoken language – or
even a gestural language, helps to reach such a mutual un-
derstanding [15][12]. Without languages, agents can still un-
derstand their respective motivations by observing their goal-
directed behaviors. Moreover, they can assume goal-directed
behaviors as a common ground [2] and adapt their own be-
havior in order to be more easily understood by others.
Developed by Baron-Cohen and Leslie [1], the Theory of
Mind (ToM) describes the ability to attribute mental states
and knowledge to others. In interactions, humans are con-
stantly collecting and analyzing huge quantity of informa-
tion to stay aware of emotions, goals, and understandings of
their fellows. Different orders of ToM are defined to express
how agents can recursively attribute a ToM to other agents:
in the first order, an agent only models others as simpler
agents, that do not perform ToM, while in the second order,
an agent also models how others model others, including it-
self. It is possible to perpetuate this recursion up to infinite
loops of mutual modeling, known as infinite regress in epis-
temic logics [3]. Agents based on second or higher orders
ToM show better performances in a range of simple social
games [5][6][7][13]. Higher orders, though outperforming
the second-order in some cases [6], do not reveal important
advantages in general [26]. Hence the second-order seems
sufficient to generate rich social behaviors [19].
In multi-agents literature, ToM-based interactions are often
presented within Interactive Partially Observed Markov De-
cision Problems (I-POMDPs) framework [9]. I-POMDPs are
a generalization of POMDPs [11] where agents have to infer
beliefs about their interactive states – that combine physical
environment states and other agent motivations – and to learn
a policy that optimizes the reception of rewards depending
on these interactive states. Solving this problem can be de-
scribed in two main steps. The belief update step is based on
the history of observations of the world and previous actions.
For instance, in [18], the Sigma (Σ) cognitive architecture
[20] uses a probabilistic graphical model [8] in order to infer
beliefs about others’ intentions given the memory of previous
events. Then, the decision step consists in choosing the best
action given the present belief state in order to optimize the
collection of rewards. This step is commonly approached as
a Markovian Decision Process (MDP) [16] in the space of
beliefs (belief-MDP). I-POMDP framework enables second-
order ToM, as performed by PsychSim architecture [19].
As the usual way to model agents solving a (belief-)MDP is
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [24], the purpose of Inverse Re-
inforcement Learning (IRL) [14] is to infer the motivations of
an observed agent, assuming this agent uses a policy that op-
timizes a RL process. In that way, IRL provides an agent with
a first-order ToM, modeling observed agents as optimized RL
agents. In [17], they use the Σ architecture to model agents
that perform RL in the belief-MDP and use IRL to infer others
reward functions. In this paper, we model second-order ToM
agents that also use IRL in order to infer their own reward
function, as it could be inferred by others. In our approach,
we provide each agent with 3 types of models. The first one,
the model of itself, is the true policy of an agent, learned via
RL. The second one, the model of another, represents the be-
liefs of the agent about another’s policy, updated via IRL. The
third one, the model of itself seen by others, represents the be-
liefs of the agent of how another agent could infer its policy,
also updated via IRL.
We propose an algorithm that uses this second-order infer-
ence in order to facilitate the mutual understanding of agents
rewards through an adaptation of the behavior. We also intro-
duce intrinsic rewards based on models of empathy and grat-
itude, leading agents to cooperative interactions. Finally, we
implement an iterative prisoner’s dilemma in order to study
the resulting behavior of our approach in a dual-agent sys-
tem. Through simulations, we explore whether our models,
with different conditions, facilitate the mutual understanding
of motivations between agents.
2 Mutual modeling
2.1 Model of itself
An agent i makes goal-directed decisions as a RL agent: at
time t, it chooses an action ati. Depending on this decision
and all other agent’s decisions {atj}j 6=i, it receives an ob-
servation ot+1i = O(a
t
1, a
t
2, ..a
t
n) (n being the number of
agents) and a reward that only depends on this observation
rt+1i = Ri(o
t+1). Each agent has its own reward function
that is unknown by other agents.
As in [22], this framework is simplified as a MDP where
the observations are treated as states that just depend on
agent’s previous observation and action following an un-
known probability distribution:
ot+1i = O(a
t
1, a
t
2, ..a
t
n) ∼ P[ot+1i |ati, oti]
Hence, at the beginning, the decision making of the agent
is performed by Q-learning [25]. Given the observation ot+1,
the agent learns the best new action at+1 in order to maximize
its future rewards (see algo. 1).
Algorithm 1: Q-learning. TD stands for Temporal Differ-
ence.
Initialize Q(o, a)
Initialize o0
forall iterations t do
Choose at from ot using policy derived from Q
Take action at, receive rt+1, ot+1
TD = rt+1 + γmaxat+1 Q(ot+1, at+1)−Q(ot, at)
Q(ot, at)← Q(ot, at) + η TD
end
2.2 Model of others
At the same time, it receives actions and observations of other
agents {atj}j 6=i and {otj}j 6=i. Given this information, it can
infer their reward functions {Rj}j 6=i by IRL. In this setup,
the IRL must be performed on-line. In [10] they provide an
incremental algorithm for on-line IRL in a MDP framework.
As our final goal is to develop agents that could interact with
humans, we want to adopt a less efficient but more intuitive
approach that looks like how any human – or child – would
infer the motivations of others. Hence we propose the follow-
ing idea:
If I liked I repeat, otherwise I change: Supposing agent j
receives an observation “light” and chooses action “press-
the-button”. Then it receives a new observation “glass-of-
juice”. If it liked the juice, probably the next time it will
observe the signal “light” then it would again choose action
“press-the-button”. Otherwise it would choose another pos-
sible action.
In order to formalize this approach, we denote as rˆti:j =
Rˆi:j(o
t
j) the reward of agent j at time t inferred by agent i.
Agent i memorizes, for each possible observation oj of agent
j, the last action Ai:j(oj) it chose facing oj . Agent i also
memorizes, for each observation oj , the previous following
observation Oi:j(oj) perceived as a consequence of choos-
ing action Ai:j(oj). If at time t, agent j observes otj and
chooses once again the action atj = Ai:j(o
t
j), it means agent
j “liked” the previous consequence of this choice, namely
oprev = Oi:j(otj). In that case, agent i increments its inferred
reward function Rˆi:j(otj) for agent j as follow:
Rˆi:j(oprev)← (1− 1√
ni:j(otj)
).Rˆi:j(oprev) +
1√
ni:j(otj)
Where ni:j(otj) is the number of times agent i observed
agent j observing otj . Contrariwise, if it chooses a different
action atj 6= Ai:j(otj), agent i decrements the estimated re-
ward function Rˆi:j(otj) for agent j:
Rˆi:j(oprev)← (1− 1√
ni:j(otj)
).Rˆi:j(oprev)− 1√
ni:j(otj)
Then, given the inferred reward functions, an agent can
predict the next action of other agents. Such a prediction can
be used to adapt its own next decision in consequence, and
also to evaluate how it is able to model other agents. This
intuitive IRL process is summarized in algo. 2.
Algorithm 2: Intuitive on-line IRL. Agent i is inferring
the reward function of agent j.
Initialize Ri:j(o)
forall iterations t do
Agent j observes otj and takes action a
t
j
if otj has already been observed by j then
Remember:
aprev = Ai:j(otj) previous action of j after o
t
j
oprev = Oi:j(otj) previous consequence
if atj = aprev then
Rˆi:j(oprev)←
(1− 1√
n(ot
j
)
).Rˆi:j(oprev) + 1√n(ot
j
)
else
Rˆi:j(oprev)←
(1− 1√
n(ot
j
)
).Rˆi:j(oprev)− 1√n(ot
j
)
end
end
Agent j then observes the new consequence ot+1j
Update memories:
Ai:j(o
t
j) = a
t
j
Oi:j(o
t
j) = o
t+1
j
ni:j(o
t
j)← ni:j(otj) + 1
end
2.3 Model of itself seen by others
In order to model itself perceived by other agents, an agent i
processes exactly the same way that it would model another
agent: it infers its own reward function Ri given its previous
actions and observations in order to estimate how other agents
would infer its reward function. In the following sections, we
denote as Rˆi:(j:i) this estimated function. As before, agent i
uses its memories of its previous choices of actionAi:(j:i)(oi)
and consequencesOi:(j:i)(oi) observed by another agent j for
all possible observations oi in order to update Rˆi:(j:i). Note
that if all agents are aware of all the true observations of oth-
ers and have the same initial estimations of others rewards
(for instance, R0i:(j:i)(oi) = R
0
j:i(oj) = 0 ∀i, j, oi, oj), we
then have the equality:
Rˆti:(j:i) = Rˆ
t
j:i ∀t
3 Expressing motivations
Until now, our agents are just behaving in an “egoist” way,
trying to maximize their own rewards. But in order to pro-
mote cooperation, we provide any agent with a behavior that
helps other agents to infer its own reward function. In that
purpose, each time it is disappointed by a small reward (or a
punishment), an agent can move the next time to another ac-
tion even if the last one was, in average, the optimal choice.
In other words, let’s say the agent has learned that, each time
it sees an observation “light”, the optimal action is “press-
the-button”. This action leads with probability 0.5 to “glass-
of-wine” associated with positive reward (R(wine) = 1) and
with probability 0.5 to “electric-shock” that is associated
with negative reward (R(shock) = −0.9), while another ac-
tion “do-nothing” always leads to “nothing” associated with
a null reward (R(nothing) = 0). In that case, a RL-based
behavior would always chose action “press-the-button” that
leads in average to a positive reward (rˆ = 0.1). But another
agent observing this behavior, with no additive information,
would infer that both “glass-of-wine” and “electric-shock”
are associated with positive rewards while “nothing” is asso-
ciated with negative (or null) reward. Now, if the agent, each
time it receives the electric shock, does nothing the very next
time it sees the light, it becomes possible for an observer to
guess it does not like the shock but tried the action because it
wanted the glass of wine.
Formally, the agent is using its model of itself seen by
others: when agent i is perceiving oi, it looks at the true
reward associated with the previous following consequence
Oi:(j:i)(oi):
rprev = Ri
(
Oi:(j:i)(oi)
)
If this reward was acceptable (e.g. superior to a fixed
threshold) the agent repeats the last action it did after observ-
ing oi, hence Ai:(j:i)(oi). Otherwise, it chooses the best of
the remaining actions (according to Q-values).
That way we enable agents to help each other in inferring
their reward functions. Now our agents have the choice
between two possible behaviors: the classical Q-learning or
this expressing-motivations behavior (described step by step
in algo. 3).
Algorithm 3: Expressing-motivations behavior. Agent i
helps agent j to infer i’s reward function.
Initialize Ri:j(o)
forall iterations t do
Agent i observes oti
if oti has already been observed by i then
Remember:
aprev = Ai:(j:i)(oti) previous action of i after o
t
i
rprev = Ri
(
Oi:(j:i)(oi)
)
previous reward
if rprev > θ then
Repeat previous action ati = aprev
else
Choose a different action ati 6= aprev using Q
end
Take action ati, receive r
t+1, ot+1
Update memories:
Ai:(j:i)(o
t
i) = a
t
i
Oi:(j:i)(o
t
i) = o
t+1
i
n(oti)← n(oti) + 1
end
end
4 Empathy and gratitude
We finally provide our agents with intrinsic rewards [23] that
depend on how they estimate the rewards of other agents. We
define two different intrinsic rewards that agents can feel ob-
serving each other’s:
Empathy eti:j of an agent i observing an agent j at a time t
is proportional to its estimation of the reward that j received:
eti:j ∝ Rˆi:j(otj)
Gratitude gti:(j:i) of an agent i observing an agent j at a
time t is proportional to its estimation of how j would infer
i’s own reward:
gti:(j:i) ∝ Rˆi:(j:i)(oti)
Our model of empathy is based on de Waal’s Action-
Percept Model framework [4]. In this context, agents have
a common set of possible actions or observations. Then em-
pathy describes the capacity to be affected by and share the
emotional state of another (inferred through this common set
of action-perception).
The intrinsic reward for gratitude is based on the idea that
“it’s the thought that counts”, expression used to indicate that
it is the kindness behind an act that matters, however imper-
fect or insignificant the act may be.
Now, at time t, as agent i observes a signal oti, it receives
a total reward rti, sum of extrinsic (Ri(o
t
i)) and intrinsic (em-
pathy and gratitude) rewards:
rtj = Ri(oi) +
∑
j 6=i
αi e
t
i:j + βi g
t
i:(j:i)
Where α and β are coefficients of proportionality that are
used to try different situations. For example, we can compare
agents that only feel empathy (α > 0, β = 0) or only grati-
tude (α = 0, β > 0). We can also explore negative values of
α and β that could lead to aggressive behaviors.
5 Prisoner’s dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is an ideal game to study the
social behavior of our agents. In that context, we focus on a 2-
agent system. Each agent has the choice between two actions:
defect or cooperate. If both agents choose to cooperate, they
receive a rewardR. If they both defect, they receive a smaller
reward P . If one agent defects while the other cooperates,
the agent that defected receives the highest reward T and the
agent that cooperated receives the smallest reward S. The
generalized form of PD requires following conditions:
T > R > P > S
The payoff relationship R > P implies that mutual coopera-
tion is superior to mutual defection, while the payoff relation-
ships T > R and P > S imply that defection is the dominant
strategy for both agents. We implemented the iterated version
of this game (IPD), where agents successively play this game
and remember previous actions of their opponent. Classical
RL agents would systematically tend to the Nash equilibrium
[21] that consists in always choosing defection.
We implemented an IPD with payoff T = 1, R = 0.6,
P = 0, S = −1. Table 1 displays the payoff matrix of this
game. Each game last 1000 iterations. At each iteration t,
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 0.6, 0.6 -1, 1
Defect 1, -1 0, 0
Table 1: IPD payoff matrix
agent i chooses action ati ∈ {cooperate, defect} and receives
a signal oti ∈ {OR,OS ,OT ,OP} associated with the corre-
sponding reward (Ri(OS) = S, etc). Agent i also receives
the action and the observation of the other agent, atj and o
t
j .
But agents are not aware of the payoff matrix that defines the
rewards of the other (in fact, it is the same).
The Q-learning behavior of agents was implemented with
parameters γ = 0.8, η = 0.05 and actions were chosen using
the Gibbs softmax method:
a ∼ P[a|o] = e
τQ(o,a)∑
b e
τQ(o,b)
With temperature parameter τ = 5.
6 Results and discussion
6.1 Pure Q-learning
We first tried to let our agents behave without expressing mo-
tivations and with no intrinsic rewards for empathy or grati-
tude (α = β = 0). As expected, agents quickly tend to the
Nash equilibrium and always defect (see figure 1). Each agent
learned a wrong reward function for the other. Table 2 shows
the average resulting reward functions learned by the agents
over 50 IPD game with 1000 iterations. We can see that with
variances agents successfully learned that the other has a neg-
ative reward S, but, since the other was always defecting at
the end, both thought that the other had strong positive reward
P that is, in fact, null (see column P of table 2).
T R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.34 -0.13 0.90 -0.75
σ2 0.39 0.52 0.16 0.13
Rˆ2:1 0.25 -0.16 0.92 -0.77
σ2 0.36 0.46 0.15 0.094
Table 2: Pure Q-learning (α = 0, β = 0). Average learned
other’s reward function by agents 1 and 2 over 50 IPD games
and variances. We can see that with small variances agents
successfully learned that the other has negative reward S , but
since the other was always defecting at the end, both thought
that the other had strong positive reward P that was, in fact,
null (see yellow cells).
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Figure 1: Pure Q-learning (α = 0, β = 0). (blue) Aver-
age trajectory of defect-cooperate ratio over 50 IPD games
and variances. +1 represents a full cooperation (both agents
cooperate) and -1 represents a full defection (both agents de-
fect). The trajectory is computed with an exponential moving
average of this ratio. (red) +/- standard deviation.
6.2 Q-learning with empathy & gratitude
Gentle vs gentle: Here we look at the behavior of agents
where both receive positive intrinsic rewards for empathy and
gratitude (α = 0.9, β = 0.3). Paradoxically, it sped up
Nash equilibrium’s attraction (see figure 2 A). As in pure Q-
learning situation, both agents learned a false reward function
where P is high for the other (see column P of table 3 A).
Indeed, they were intrinsically rewarded by empathy while
they were defecting. Furthermore, as they also learned that
the other is punished while they both cooperate (see column
R of table 3 A), they were intrinsically punished while they
cooperated.
Aggressive vs aggressive: This time we looked at the op-
posite situation, where both agents were intrinsically pun-
ished by empathy or gratitude (α = −0.9, β = −0.3). Again
paradoxically, it slowed down Nash equilibrium’s attraction
(see figure 2 B). For the same reason: since both agents
learned the other is rewarded by P , they were intrinsically
punished when they defected while the other was cooperat-
ing (see column P of table 3 B).
A
T R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.39 -0.28 1. -0.69
σ2 1.9e-01 2.2e-01 1.7e-27 7.8e-02
Rˆ2:1 0.56 -0.32 0.99 -0.62
σ2 1.6e-01 2.5e-01 7.7e-08 9.6e-02
B
T R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.79 -0.23 0.58 -0.41
σ2 0.073 0.14 0.16 0.089
Rˆ2:1 0.65 -0.16 0.55 -0.37
σ2 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.083
Table 3: A: Gentle vs gentle (α = 0.9, β = 0.3). B: Agres-
sive vs agressive (α = −0.9, β = −0.3). Average learned
other’s reward function by agents 1 and 2 over 50 IPD games
and variances. We can see that with small variances agents
successfully learned that the other has negative reward S , but
since the other was always defecting at the end, both thought
that the other had strong positive reward P that was, in fact,
null. Furthermore, they also learned that the other was pun-
ished while they were both cooperating and receiving reward
R (see yellow cells).
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Figure 2: A: Gentle vs gentle (α = 0.9, β = 0.3). B: Agres-
sive vs agressive (α = −0.9, β = −0.3). (blue) Average
trajectory of defect-cooperate ratio over 50 IPD games and
variances. +1 represents a full cooperation (both agents co-
operate) and -1 represents a full defection (both agents de-
fect). The trajectory is computed with an exponential moving
average of this ratio. (red) +/- standard deviation.
6.3 Expressing motivations with empathy &
gratitude
Here we implemented the expressing-motivations behavior
described in section 3. The choice of the threshold θ that
determines if the previous reward was worth to repeat the pre-
vious action is tricky in the case of IPD. If P < θ ≤ R , then
agents always cooperate. Indeed, as soon as both agents de-
fect, they simultaneously change to cooperation and keep co-
operating till the end. For a similar reason, if P ≥ θ, then, if
both agents start by cooperation, they always cooperate other-
wise they always defect. In both cases, they can not efficiently
learn the reward function of the other. This singularity comes
from the fact that agents just have two possibilities of action.
To avoid this problem, we used a random threshold θ that is,
with probability p = R, higher than R and with probability
1 − p smaller than R (which amounts, in our case, to take
θ uniformly in [0;1]). In a way, this stochastic choice repre-
sents the hesitation of agents between two temptations: to be
content withR or to focus on maximal reward T .
In our simulations, at the beginning (from t = 0 up to t =
300) both agents are following Q-learning behavior. Then,
during a phase (from t = 301 up to t = 700) they express
their motivations using the algorithm of section 3. Finally,
assuming they had time to learn about each other, they move
back to Q-learning till the end (from t = 701 up to t = 1000).
Only empathy: we first look at the resulting behavior
when both agents just receive intrinsic reward for empathy
(α = 0.9, β = 0). As a result, at the beginning agents were
attracted by Nash equilibrium. Then, while they were ex-
pressing their motivations, in average they defected as much
as they cooperated. After this expressing phase, agent could
better understand each other’s motivations (see table 4 A)
and, led by intrinsic reward for empathy, they started to al-
ways cooperate (see figure 3 A).
Only gratitude: this time both agents just receive intrinsic
reward for gratitude (α = 0., β = 0.9). As a result, at the
beginning agents were attracted by Nash equilibrium. Then,
while they were expressing their motivations, they defected
as much as they cooperated in average. After this expressing
phase, agent could not understand each other’s motivations
(see table 4, B) and although led by gratitude, they started to
always defect (see figure 3 B).
Empathy and gratitude: Finally we look at the result-
ing behavior when both agents receive intrinsic rewards for
both empathy and gratitude (α = 0.9, β = 0.3). Like
in only-empathy condition, agents successfully understood
each other’s motivations (see table 4 C). But adding the in-
trinsic reward for gratitude sped up the cooperation after
the expressing-motivations phase, increasing the frequency of
double cooperation (see figure 3 C).
6.4 Playing with empathy
Regarding results of subsection 6.3 it appears that with
expressing-motivations phases, empathy is a necessary and
sufficient condition to reach cooperation, while gratitude
added to empathy stabilizes this cooperation. This is why we
finally focused just on empathy in order to explore all possible
combination of the α parameters of both agents (α1 for agent
1, α2 for agent 2). For that, we divided the area of possible
values in a grid of 20 values between -1 and 1 for both param-
eters α. We simulated 10 IDP games with an expressing moti-
vations phase for each of the 400 resulting combinations. We
displayed the average final defect-cooperate ratio (the same
measure used for all figure in the previous subsection) on a
map reported in figure 3 D. We can see that cooperation only
AT R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.56 0.99 -0.92 -0.68
σ2 7.6e-02 3.0e-09 9.1e-02 1.0e-01
Rˆ2:1 0.54 0.99 -0.88 -0.72
σ2 9.3e-02 4.6e-10 9.5e-02 9.3e-02
B
T R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.58 -0.068 0.99 -0.68
σ2 5.3e-02 6.9e-02 3.9e-07 3.9e-02
Rˆ2:1 0.58 -0.064 0.99 -0.66
σ2 0.034 0.095 8.5e-4 0.034
C
T R P S
Truth 1 0.6 0 -1
Rˆ1:2 0.62 1. -0.95 -0.7
σ2 7.0e-02 1.8e-17 1.4e-02 8.6e-02
Rˆ2:1 0.55 1. -0.933 -0.77
σ2 7.7e-02 1.9e-17 2.2e-02 7.4e-02
Table 4: A: Only empathy (α = 0.9, β = 0). B: Only
gratitude (α = 0, β = 0.9). C: Empathy and gratitude
(α = 0.9, β = 0.3). Average learned other’s reward function
by agents 1 and 2 over 50 IPD games and variances. Between
times t = 301 and t = 700 agents were following expressing-
motivations behavior. Agents could learn each other’s moti-
vations and understood that T andR are positive rewards for
the other. As they finally always cooperated (because of em-
pathy), they estimated other’s rewards higher for R than for
T (see yellow cells).
occurs when both agents have a higher enough intrinsic re-
ward for empathy (α >∼ 0.5 in this case). Interestingly, at
the edge between cooperations and Nash equilibrium’s defec-
tions, appears a balanced zone, where agents equally defect
or cooperate (see green area on figure 3 D).
7 Conclusion
Cooperation in IPD game is said to be irrational. Regard-
ing animals and humans behaviors, we can however observe
quantities of such irrational behaviors emerging out of a
stressful world, such as friendship or love. Models of natural
selection brought global explanations of this emergence, but
the detailed causes and mechanisms leading to such complex
abilities in animals remain unknown. We strongly believe that
no social behaviors would spring up without conditions im-
plying that it was rational to behave that way. With this work,
we claim that cooperation is no more irrational when agents
can express and understand each other’s motivations.
We introduce a cognitive architecture enabling a second or-
der of theory of mind for social agents. This architecture is
not recursive in the sense that each agent develop models for
itself, others or itself perceived by others and none of these
models recursively enable a theory of mind. Agents are mod-
eled as RL-agents and use IRL to model others or themselves
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Figure 3: A: Only empathy (α = 0.9, β = 0). B: Only
gratitude (α = 0, β = 0.9). C: Empathy and gratitude
(α = 0.9, β = 0.3). (blue) Average trajectory of defect-
cooperate ratio over 50 IPD games and variances. +1 repre-
sents a full cooperation (both agents cooperate) and -1 repre-
sents a full defection (both agents defect). The trajectory is
computed with an exponential moving average of this ratio.
Between times t = 301 and t = 700 agents were follow-
ing expressing-motivations behavior. (red) +/- standard de-
viation. D: Average final defect-cooperate ratio over 10 IDP
games for a grid of 400 possible (α1, α2) combinations. In
each game, agents were adopting expressing-motivations be-
havior between time t = 301 and t = 700. Red areas corre-
spond to combinations that led to cooperation while blue ar-
eas correspond to combinations that led to Nash equilibrium.
In green areas, agents were equally defecting and cooperat-
ing.
seen by others. In this framework, it is possible to design
a decision making algorithm aiming to enable agents to ex-
press each other’s motivations. We add two intrinsic rewards
based on empathy and gratitude, empathy being the ability to
feel others rewards while gratitude is the ability to feel how
others would estimate its own rewards. Through an 2-agent
system based on IPD game, we show that when agents can
express their motivations, the intrinsic reward for empathy is
a necessary and sufficient condition to promote cooperation,
while gratitude added to empathy seems to speed up and to
stabilize this cooperation.
We make the assumption that the behavior used to express
motivation could also be understood by humans and hence
improve Human-Robot interactions, especially in cooperative
tasks. In further work, we will explore HRI testbeds, us-
ing e.g. a PD game within a human vs robot context. Our
question regards to what extent humans would understand
the expressing-motivations behavior, and to what extent the
robot’s IRL would infer humans motivations.
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